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[L. A. No. 24880. In Bank. July 17, 1958.] 
EVERETT T. PLUMER, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; 
MARGARET L. PLUMER, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Divorce-Enforcement of Awards-Execution: Oontempt Pro-
ceedings-Punishment.-Where a husband and wife bargain 
with each other and agree that the terms of their contract shall 
thereupon and thenceforth grant, delimit and exclusively define 
their respective rights and obligations inter ,e, then it is to the 
contract alone, and to conventional civil proceedings for the 
enforcement of contract rights, that they must look for a 
remedy in the event of breach; inclusion of such contract in a 
divorce judgment may furnish a basis for subsequent proceed-
ings leading to issuance of a writ of execution, but cannot 
support a commitment to imprisonment for failure to pay the 
judgment debt. 
[2] ld.-Enforcement of Awards-Oontempt Proceedings-PUDish-
ment.-Payments provided in a properly settlement agreement 
. which are found to constitute an adjustment of property inter-
ests rather than a severable provision for alimony should be 
held to fan within the proscription against imprisonment for 
debt; if the obligation sought to be enforced is contractual 
and negotiated, as distinguished from marital and imposed 
by law, even though the contract relates to marriage obliga-
tions, the remedy must be appropriate to the right asserted. 
[8] ld.-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings-Punish-
ment.-Payments which fan into the category of law-imposed 
alimony or separate maintenance are based on the statutory 
obligation of marital support,may be modified by the court on 
a proper showing, ordinarily terminate with the death of 
either party, and may be held not to constitute a "debt" within 
the meaning of the constitutional provision against imprison-
ment for debt. ~. 
[4] ld.-Enforcement of Awards-Oontempt Proceedings-Punish-
ment.-Where a proPerty settlement agreement between hUIl-
band and wife incorporated in a divorce decree is integrated, 
but the order for wife and tlhild support based thereon was 
subject to modification in accordance with the express terms 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 252 et seq.; Am. 
Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 666 et seq. 
McX. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, 11249, 266; [2-4] Divorce, 
1266; [5] Divorce,§203; [6,8] Divorce,§293; [7] Divorce,§300. 
) 
) 
.632 :P.Lt7JIER tI.SlJPEJUOR CouRT {50 0.2<1 
of the agreement, which provides that the court cannot con- I 
sider an increase in the wife's income as "a changed condi- • 
tion" unless her income exceeds "the monthly average of 
$250," the support obligations, whether as originally lIIJr8ed on 
by the parties or as they might be subsequently modified by ! 
court order pursuant to the terms of the agreement, are con- ' 
tractual and negotiated as distinguished from marital and : 
law-imposed, and the enforcement of such payments by' 
contempt proceedings is precluded by the constitutional pro-
hibition against imprisonment for dcbt. 
[6] Id.-Permanent AlimOD7-E1feet of Agreement of Parties.-
A provision in a property settlement agreement between hus-
band and wife incorporated in a divorce decree that monthly 
payments for the wife were to continue for a fixed period of 
five years regardless of the wife's remarriage at any time 
within that period, and that the court could not terminate 
but could only modify, subject to contractual limitation, such 
payments, showed that the payments represented the result of 
a bargain negotiated by the spouses in adjustment of their 
interests in their property settlement rather than the mere 
recognition of a law-imposed obligation. 
[8] IeL-Support of Ohildren-E1fect of Agreement of Parties.-
The law imposes an obligation on a father to furnish child 
support, and the law-imposed obligation cannot be contracted 
away by the parents. 
[7] IeL-Bupport of Ohildren-Kodiflcation of AlloWaDce.-Where 
the obligation to pay an agreed amount for child support is 
made an integral pari of a property settlement agreement 
incorporated in a divorce decree, the payments ordinarily are 
Dot subject to reduction, but they may be increased by the 
court if the child's welfare requires it, and that without regard 
to the liabilities of the parties or their rights "'fer ae under 
the agreement. 
[8] Id.-Bupport of Ohlldren-E1fect of Agreement of Parties.-
While a child support obligation could be reduced by virtue of 
an agreement of the parties incorporated in a divorce decree, 
a contractual limitation on the court's power to make any 
reduction clearly stamps the obligation for child support pay-
ments as a contractual obligation rather than a law-imposed 
obligation. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Superior Court of 
L'Os Angeles County vacating suspension of a sentence for 
contempt and ordering the sentence "into effect forthwith." 
Orders adjudging petitioner in contempt and vacating sus-
pension of sentence thereon, annulled. 
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James E. West, Jr., and Steven Edmondson for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Hahn, Ross & Saunders and E. Loyd Saunders for Real 
Party in Interest. 
SPENCE, J.-Petitioner seeks annulment of an order of 
the respondent court vacating the suspension of a sentence for 
contempt and ordering the sentence "into effect forthwith." 
Said sentence had been imposed upon petitioner for his failure 
to make certain payments for the support of his former wife 
and his child as provided in the spouses' agreement and decree 
of divorce. He contends that enforcement of his obligations 
thereunder through contempt proceedings constitutes a vio-
lation of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment 
for debt. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Our review of the 
record leads us to the conclusion that petitioner's contention 
must be sustained. 
On September 22, 1954, petitioner and his then wife entered 
into an agreement "to effect a final and complete settlement of 
their respective property rights, support, alimony and custody 
of their child with reference to their marital status and to 
each other." The agreement obligated petitioner to pay to 
his wife $200 a month as alimony and an additional $200 a 
month for the support of their child until the age of majority. 
The obligation for alimony payments was to cease upon the 
wife's "death or remarriage," except that in the case of the 
wife's remarriage such payments should "be continued until 
five (5) years from Septemher 25, 1954," though she "may 
have remarried within said period of time." It was further 
provided that so long as the wife'8 earnings or other income 
did not exceed the monthly average of $250, any increase 
in her income would not be considered a "changed condition" 
in connection with any attempt by petitioner to obtain a reduc-
tion in the monthly support -payments for the wife or child. 
Each party released the other from all present and future 
claims and rights to support, separate maintenance, alimony. 
court costs, attorneys' fees, and all properly rights of any kind 
except as the agreement provided. 
On November I, 1954. an interlocutory decree of divorce 
was entered, approving the agreement and ordering petitioner 
to pay the specified sums. On Spptember 28, 1955, after find-
ing that petitioner had the ability to comply, the court ad-
judged him guilty of contempt in failing to make the payments 
/) 
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as ordered and sentenced him to five days in the county jan. 
The sentence was ordered suspended on condition that he make 
the subsequently accruing payments and also an additional 
payment of $10 a month to apply on the arrearages. 
On December 11, 1955, petitioner obtained an order direct-
ing the wife to show cause why the payments for support of 
the wife and child should not be reduced on the ground that 
his income had materially decreased. At the hearing the wife 
moved to dismiss on the ground that the support payments 
had been ordered pursuant to an integrated property settle-
ment agreement and could be reduced only in conformity with 
the provisions of the agreement relating to modification, and 
that these did not encompass a decrease in petitioner's income 
as a basis for modification. The trial court thereafter dis-
missed the order to show cause. Petitioner appealed, contend-
ing that the agreement was not integrated but that even if it 
was, a material reduction in his income was a ground for 
modification within the express provisions of the agreement. 
This court reversed the order dismissing petitioner's applica-
tion for modification, holding that although the decree was 
based upon an integrated agreement, the monthly payments 
specified in the decree were subject to modification by the 
court since the parties had "expressly so provided" in the 
agreement. (Plumer v. Plumer, 48 Cal.ld 820, 825-826 [313 
P.ld 549].) 
During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner appeared in 
the trial court several times for the purpose of determining 
his compliance with, the terms of suspension of the contempt 
order. At the various hearings petitioner produced, over 
objection, evidence as to his financial circumstanct'S seeking to 
show that although he was not making the support payments 
in accordance with the terms of the order of suspension, he 
was complying to the best of his ability. On May 13, 1957, 
following the commissioner's findings and recommendations, 
the court made its order continuing the suspension of sentence. 
The former wife filed exceptions thereto, primarily premised 
upon the record of payments, showing that petitioner had 
failed to comply, with the terms of said suspension. The 
matter was submitted and on June 13, 1957, the court vacated 
its May 13 order and ordered the contempt sentence "into 
effect forthwith." 
The determinative question is whether the constitutional 
provision against imprisonment for debt (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 15) precludes the use of contempt proceedings to enforce 
) 
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petitioner's obligations under the divorce decree and property 
settlement agreement. As above noted, this agreement was 
held to be "clearly integrated!' (Plumer v. Plumer, supra, 
48 Ca1.2d 820.) "It deals both with rights to marital prop-
erty and rights to support. The parties have set forth their 
purpose 'to effect a final and complete settlement of their ... 
rights ... with reference to their marital status and to each 
other.' They have released each other from all claims arising 
out of the marital relationship except as provided in the 
agreement." (Ibid. at p. 825.) 
[1] In Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509 [310 
P.2d 634], the remedy of contempt was denied where pay-
ments to a former wife were deemed "an inseverable part of 
an integrated adjustment of all property relations of the 
parties and not ... a severable provision for alimony." 
(P.518.) This court said at page 521: "[W]here the parties 
bargain with each other and agree that the terms of their 
contract shall thereupon and thenceforth grant, delimit and 
exclusively define their respective rights and obligations inter 
se, then it is to the contract alone, and to conventional civil 
proceedings for the enforcement of contract rights, that they 
must look for a remedy in the event of breach. Inclusion 
of such a contract in a judgment of divorce may furnish a 
basis for subsequent proceedings leading to issuance ofa writ 
of execution but cannot support a commitment to imprison-
ment for failure to pay the judgment debt." [2] And at 
page 522, it is declared to be "the better view" that "pay-
ments provided in a property settlement agreement which are 
found to constitute an adjustment of property interests, rather 
than a severable provision for alimony, should be held to fall 
within the constitutional proscription against imprisonment 
for debt. That is, if the obligation sought to be enforced 
is contractual and negotiated, as distinguished from marital 
and imposed by law, even though the contract relates to 
marriage obligations, the r«:medy must be appropriate to thc 
right asserted. [3] Payinents which fall into the category 
of law-imposed alimony or separate maintenance are based 
upon the statutory obligation of marital support, may be 
modified by the court upon a proper showing, ordinarily ter-
minate with the death of either party, and may properly 
be held not to constitute a 'debt' within the meaning of the 
constitutional provision." 
[4] In the present case, the provision for monthly support 
payments for both the wife and the child could be reduced by 
636 'PLUMERtI. SUPERIOR COURT {50C.2d 
court order, but only because tbe parties had "expressly flO 
provided," and therefore any limitations embodied in their 
agreement constituted limitations upon the court's power to 
equate the support provisions of the decree with the law-
imposed obligations as distinguished from the parties' con-
tractual obligations. (Plumer v. Plumer, supra, 48 Ca1.2d 
"820, 825.) While the "plain language" of their agreement 
indicated that "the parties contemplated modification upon 
an adequate showing of changed circumstances," there was the 
express limitation to the effect that the court could not 
consider an increase in the wife's income as •• a changed 
condition" unless her income exceeded "the monthly average 
of $250." (Ibid. at p. 826.) If the provisions of the agree-
ment and decree for monthly payments had been severable 
provisions for alimony and child support, unencumbered by 
any such contractual limitation, the court might have consid-
ered any change in the wife's income as a changed circum-
stance. Accordingly, petitioner's obligations, whether as 
originally agreed upon by the parties or as they might be 
subsequently modified by court order pursuant to the terms 
of the parties' agreement, are contractual and neA"otiated 
as distinguished from marital and law-imposed, and therefore 
the enforcement of such payments by contempt proceedings 
is precluded by the constitutional prohibition against impris-
onment for debt. 
[6] With respect to the monthly payments for the wife, 
the parties' express provision for the duration of such pay-
ments further shows that such payments represented "the 
result of a bargain negotiated by [them) in adjustment of 
their respective interests" in their property settlement rather 
than the mere recognition of a law-imposed obligation. (Brad-
ley v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.2d 509, 522.) Thus it 
appears that the parties' agreement and decree provided for 
monthly payments for the wife which were to continue for a 
fixed period of five years regardless of the wife's remarriage 
at any time within that period. Furthermore, the court could 
not terminate but could only modify, subject to the contrac-
tuallimitation, such monthly payments. (Plu.mer v. Plumer, 
supra, 48 Ca1.2d 820, 826.) Here again, if the provisions of 
the agreement and decree for monthly payments for support 
of the wife had been severable provisions for alimony, the 
court could not have continued such payments beyond the 
time of the wife's remarriage and could have terminated such 
payments at any time upon a proper showing. 
) 
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[6] With reference to child support, there can be no doubt 
that the law imposes an obligation on a father to furnish such 
support, and the law-imposed obligation cannot be contracted 
away by the parents. (Rasher v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 
556, 559-560 [71 P.2d 918].) [7] And where the obligation 
to pay an agreed amount is made an integral part of a prop-
erty settlement agreement, the payments ordinarily "are not 
subject to reduction, but thE'Y might be increased by the court 
if the child's welfare requires it, and that without regard to 
what the liabilities of the parties may be, and their rights 
inter se under the agreement." (Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Ca1. 
2d 833, 843 [136 P.2d 1].) These rules merely recognize the 
court's power to provide adequate support for the protection 
of the interests of the child. (Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 126 
Cal.App.2d 238, 244 [271 P.2d 910] ; Streeter v. Streeter, 67 
Cal.App.2d 138, 144 [153 P.2d 441].) [8] While in the 
present case, the child support obligation could have been 
reduced by virtue of the agreement of the parties, the above-
mentioned contractual limitation upon the court's power to 
make any such reduction clearly stamps the oblig-ation for 
such child support payments as a contractual obligation rather 
than a law-imposed obligation. 
We therefore conclude that under the circumstances before 
us, none of petitioner's contractual obligations can be en-
forced by contempt proceedings in view of the constitutional 
prohibition against imprisonment for debt. (Bradley v. 
Superior Cottrt, supra, 48 Ca1.2d 509, 522.) The foregoing 
conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the propriety of 
the court's order reinstating the contempt sentence in the 
absence of a concurrent finding of petitioner's then ability to 
comply with the terms of payment. 
The order dated September 28, 1955, adjudging petitioner 
in contempt, and the order dated June 13, 1957, vacating the 
suspension of sentence thereon, are annulled. 
,'. 
"" Gibson, C. J., Shenk;J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the 
majority opinion annulling the orders which adjudge peti-
tioner in contempt of court for his failure to pay amounts 
provided for in an integrated property settlement agreement. 
It will be recalled that when this case was previously before 
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I pointed out in my dissenting opinion (p. 826 et seq.) that 
the agreement in question was clearly an integrated property 
settlement agreement and not subject to modification except as 
provided in said agreement and that since the only condition 
upon which said agreement could be modified had not oc-
curred, the. trial court was justified in dismissing defendant's 
application for modification of said agreement. It seems to 
me to be clearly inconRistent for this court to hold, as it did 
in its prior decision (48 Ca1.2d 820) that a property settle-
ment agreement is subject to modification with respect to 
payments to the wife, and yet the trial court has no power 
to enforce such modified payments in a contempt proceeding. 
This is the effect of the two decisions of this court involving 
the property settlement agreement which is the subject of this 
action. In other words, it was held by the majority in its 
former decision (48 Ca1.2d 820) that the property settle-
ment agreement here involved was subject to modification 
upon a showing of changed conditions. Such holding led to 
the inevitable conclusion that the payments constituted pay-
ments for support and maintenance which the trial court had 
the power to exact from the husband and likewise had the 
power to force him to make such payments by resort to the 
extraordinary power of contempt. To now hold that the 
payments were subject to modification and that the court has 
no power to enforce the same by a contempt proceeding, is, 
in my opinion, in direct conflict with the former holding of 
this court (48 Ca1.2d 820). If, however, the payments consti-
tuted an integral part of an integrated property settlement 
agreement, they clearly· fell within the rule announced by 
this court in Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Ca1.2d 509 [310 
P.2d 634], and could not be enforced by a contempt proceed-
ing. There seems to be no end to the intricacies which have 
emerged from the unsound pronouncements of this court dur-
ing the past four years since the majority of this court has 
undertaken the extrajudicial function of rewriting property 
I'lettlement agreements (Delder v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36 [265 
P.2d 873] ; Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 49 [265 P.2d 881] ; Flynn v. 
Flynn,42 Ca1.2d 55 [265 P.2d 865]; Messenger v. Messenger. 
46 Ca1.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988] ; Anderson v. Mart, 47 Cal.2<1 
274 [303 P.2d 539]; Herda v. Herda, 48 Ca1.2d 228 [308 
P.2d 705] ; Plumer v. Plumer, 48 Ca1.2d 820 [313 P.2d 549] ). 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
My views with respect to the enforcement of integrated 
bargains by contempt proceedings are set forth in a dissenting 
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opinion in Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Ca1.2d 509, 523 [310 
P.2d 634]. Although these views remain unchanged, I would 
concur in the juugment herein under the compulsion of that 
case if it necessarily controlled the present one. 
The present case, however, differs from the Bradley case in 
that plaintiff has not remarried and the payments are partly 
for child support. Accordingly, the payments are partly in 
lieu of the statutory obligation to support. In integrated bar-
gains the monthly payments will ordinarily have a dual char-
acter. "To the extent that they are designed to discharge 
the obligation of support and maintenance they will ordinarily 
reflect the characteristics of that obligation and thus have 
the indicia of alimony. [Citations.] On the other hand, to 
the extent that they represent a division of the community 
property itself, or constitute an inseparable part of the con-
sideration for the property settlement, they are not alimony, 
and accordingly cannot be modified without changing the 
terms of the property settlement agreement of the parties." 
(Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36, 41-42 [265 P.2d 873].) So 
long as the wife has not remarried or there is a continuing obli· 
gation of child support, the characteristics of the obligation 
to support remain and alone justify enforcement by contempt. 
Such a rule is implicit in Miller v. SlIperior Court, 9 Ca1.2d 
733, 740 [72 P.2d 868], where the court took care to point 
out that the payments were ordered pursuant to a property 
settlement and could not be changed without the consent of 
the parties. Although the majority rejected this reasoning in 
the Bradley case, it had only to decide in that case whether 
contempt would lie to enforce an integrated bargain after 
the wife had remarried and the characteristics of the support 
and maintenance obligation were no longer present. 
A rule that the wife's right to enforce the agreement by 
contempt terminates only on her remarriage would permit the 
parties to make a final settlement of all their marital rights 
without compelling the wife to . .ghre up contempt enforcement 
while she is still dependent·on her former husband for sup-
port. So long as the Bradley decision remains law, I would 
adopt such a rule instead of following the Bradley rationale to 
its logical extreme. 
